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SIZING THE C ARRIERS
A Brief History of Alternatives
Sam J. Tangredi

I

ronically, it was an arms-control treaty that set the U.S. Navy on the course of
building a fleet centered on fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flightdeck aircraft carriers. Such ships sometimes are referred to as supercarriers.
THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION

The First Carriers
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921–22—now at its hundredth anniversary—
was an attempt by President Warren G. Harding and his Secretary of State,
Charles Evans Hughes, to restrain a global naval arms race, particularly the naval
competition among Great Britain, the United States, and Japan.1 Idealism played
a role, but there also was huge financial incentive; for the United States, with its
army rapidly demobilized following World War I, naval expenditure was one of
the largest federal government outlays.2 And the most expensive platform was
the battleship—the capital ship of its day. Much as nuclear warheads were during
the later SALT/START era, battleships were the
Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is the Leidos Chair of Future
ultimate measure of military power.3
Warfare Studies and professor of national, naval,
In contrast, the fledgling aircraft carrier constiand maritime strategy at the Naval War College.
tuted an auxiliary issue during treaty negotiations,
He served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, retiring
as a captain. His most recent book (as coeditor) is
and for the United States and Britain an aggregate
AI at War: How Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,
limit of 135,000 tons eventually was set, rather than
and Machine Learning Are Changing Naval Warfare (Naval Institute Press, 2021). In 1981–82, any specific number of platforms; imperial Japan
then-Lieutenant Tangredi was boilers and propul- would be permitted 81,000 tons, per the 5 : 5 : 3 forsion fuels officer in USS Ranger (CV 61).
mula that guided the conference.4 However, there
were some sublimits; no future carrier individually
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was to exceed 27,000 tons displacement (nor carry any gun larger than an eightinch). By the time of the treaty, Britain—which had invented the all-aviation warship—had commissioned five aircraft carriers, with two others under construction. All except the first displaced between 26,000 and 29,000 tons—the obvious
source of the treaty limit on individual ships. In contrast, the United States had
not yet commissioned its first carrier, USS Langley (CV 1), which was a converted
collier that would have a displacement of approximately 14,000 tons at full load.
Japan was building its first aircraft carrier—the world’s first purpose-built carrier
constructed from the keel up, not a conversion—IJN Hosho, displacing slightly
less than 10,000 tons.5 In consideration of the Royal Navy’s advantage, the treaty
conference declared Langley and Hosho to be “experimental,” thereby not counting
against the tonnage limit.6
To American naval aviation, the 135,000-ton limit was actually a godsend. The
U.S. Congress had expressed no interest previously in ever building an aircraft
carrier fleet to that aggregate size, and in its long-range planning for the construction of future carriers the Navy leadership had expected much less from a fiscally
conservative Congress.7 Yet throughout the life of the treaty, the Department of
the Navy was able to argue that the legislature needed to authorize building to
that limit to maintain parity with the other treaty signatories—an argument that
Congress eventually accepted.8
More importantly, there was another method of appealing to frugality.
In addition to the United States disposing of older battleships and cruisers to
achieve treaty limits in their respective categories, there were a number of underconstruction warships, authorized during World War I but not completed, that
would need to be scrapped. The American delegation to the Washington Conference proposed that each of the principal naval powers be allowed to convert two
unfinished hulls into carriers, even if their displacements exceeded the 27,000ton individual limit. Although this was of no advantage to a Royal Navy that was
almost at its aggregate limit already, the proposal was accepted. As the U.S. Navy
already had selected two unfinished battle cruisers, both of which likely would
displace 33,000 tons, the conference agreed to 33,000 as the conversion limit.
From this conversion came USS Lexington (CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3).9
Until construction of USS Midway (CV 41) in 1945, they were the biggest and
fastest (thirty-one-plus knots) aircraft carriers the United States had built. Their
large hulls and flight decks allowed them to accommodate the steadily increasing
size of naval aircraft without the need for continual modification.10
Small Carriers and the Flying-Deck Cruiser
The true significance of the acquisition of Lexington and Saratoga is that—until
the two ships proved their superiority in the fleet battle problems of the late
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1920s—even the staunchest supporters of naval aviation within the Navy’s leadership were convinced that a larger number of smaller carriers would be more
operationally effective than a smaller number of supercarriers.11
Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, the first chief of the Department of the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics—and often considered the father of naval aviation—
was one of those so convinced.12 While pleased with the commissioning of Lexington and Saratoga—whose allowance he himself essentially had arranged, as an
influential expert assigned to the Washington Conference—Moffett frequently
stated that “there is a far greater flight deck area available on a large number of
small ships than a small number of large ships.”13
Following the Washington Conference, Moffett drew up proposals for five carriers of 13,800 tons—the smallest tonnage that could provide a flight deck of acceptable length.14 With 66,000 of the 135,000 tons permitted by treaty taken up by
Lexington and Saratoga, the five small carriers would bring the Navy to the treaty
limit while maximizing the number of flight decks.
However, Moffett considered the resulting seven total carriers to be insufficient, so he drafted an additional proposal for the construction of eight hybrid
“flying deck cruisers.”15 Such a vessel would retain its forward emplaced guns but
would have a flight deck covering most of the ship aft of the deckhouse. Moffett’s argument was that, as cruisers, these ships would not count under the treaty
limitations on carriers.16 Estimated tonnage for each of these vessels was 10,000
tons—the limit for cruisers.17
The flying-deck cruiser actually gained the support of the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), Admiral William V. Pratt, who—unlike Moffett—viewed
it more as a cruiser than a small carrier.18 However, the Navy General Board,
whose recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy effectively took precedence over the individual views of the CNO (until Admiral Ernest J. King became CNO as well as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in March 1942), was
cool to the idea, rejecting it first in 1925.19 The follow-on to the Washington
Conference, the London Naval Conference of 1930, retained the 135,000-ton
limit on aircraft carriers.20 This caused the General Board to reconsider, and
Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams requested $20 million for an experimental flying-deck cruiser in the Navy’s fiscal year (FY) 1932 budget request to
Congress—unsuccessfully.21 There were at least two congressional supporters,
but by then expenditures for the Navy no longer were a priority.22 With the
onset of the Great Depression, neither the 13,800-ton small carriers nor the
10,000-ton flying-deck cruisers were built. Congress simply would not provide
the money, and by the mid-1930s few in the naval leadership viewed either
solution as a cost-effective method of massing airpower at sea.
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Every Ship a Carrier?
Additionally, Moffett advocated that all ships, from battleship to destroyer,
should embark aircraft: floatplanes (seaplanes), launched from trainable catapults. On their return, such planes would land on the ocean surface, then be
winched back aboard. Tests proved that installation on destroyers was impractical; however, many battleships and cruisers were fitted with two scout aircraft.
Moffett had argued for at least four—two scouts and two fighters. Proposed for
the biggest ships was an addition of two bombers, for a total of six planes. In his
estimate, these aircraft could conduct “small scale” offensive operations until the
arrival of a carrier.23
Selected ships retained and operated catapult aircraft in World War II for
scouting and for spotting for gunfire, particularly when carriers were not available (such as at the 1944 Normandy invasion). However, the physical limitations
of such seaplanes made them incapable of dueling with wheeled carrier aircraft
and most land-based planes. The pre–World War II Navy was never afraid to
retain “legacy systems” that might prove useful, and it experimented with and operated seaplanes from combatants for twenty-four years. But the sea itself proved
too treacherous a landing deck, regardless of its “low acquisition cost.” Not only
was it difficult to mass effects from small numbers of dispersed seaplanes—all of
them inferior in combat capabilities to their land-based counterparts—but the
environment itself proved the concept impracticable, and conducting small-scale
offensive operations appeared suicidal.
However, technology did demonstrate eventually (about forty years after Moffett’s proposal) that the concept of every ship being able to carry aircraft was, in
fact, viable—once the helicopter was perfected. Starting in the 1970s, the U.S. Navy’s Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) embarked at least one aircraft
(helicopter), and often two, on almost all cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, while
a landing spot for a visiting helicopter was added to almost every other type of
naval vessel.
These were very specialized aircraft, primarily designed for low, slow, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations, not for contesting with carrier-based
conventional aircraft. LAMPS—like the problematic, preceding, drone antisubmarine helicopter (known as DASH) program and the subsequent embarkeddrone aircraft of today—could be said to “conduct ‘small scale’ offensive operations until the arrival of a carrier.”24 But that is only to conduct several specialized
missions, in which the aircraft in question remain highly vulnerable to attack by
conventional aircraft.25 The most advanced vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing
(V/STOL) aircraft—even if they could be operated from ships smaller than bigdeck amphibious warships—cannot match the range, lift capacity, or combat effectiveness of carrier aircraft (despite vociferous claims to the contrary by their
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/5
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proponents).26 In any case, the concept clearly has yet to be proved as a substitute
for a large-deck, all-aviation ship.
The Light Carrier Experience: USS Ranger
Moffett continued to consider the advantages of numerous smaller carriers, even
as the speed and size of USS Saratoga enabled its famous simulated surprise attack on the Panama Canal in 1929.27 Less heralded—perhaps because it seemed
so disturbing in the light of subsequent events—was Lexington and Saratoga’s
combined simulated surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1932.28 Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, gradually had increased the aircraft complement of Saratoga, as well as on the small, slow Langley;
while Saratoga was rated at seventy-four aircraft, Reeves increased its air wing to
ninety, and Langley’s aircraft load was doubled from twenty-four to forty-eight.29
Theoretically, two small carriers could provide the same number of aircraft in
the air if they could be operated together against one lone large carrier. But what
bedeviled Moffett—as it has every other small-carrier proponent up to today—is
that he could not build a suitably capable smaller carrier for half the price of a
larger ship that would have more than double the combat effectiveness. In building
USS Ranger (CV 4) at 18,000 tons full displacement, he was able to keep the financial cost (in contemporaneous dollars) to approximately half the final construction
cost of either Lexington or Saratoga, but it was at the opportunity cost of speed,
survivability (no underwater protection, and consistently overweight in terms of
sea keeping), and aircraft and weapons load. (In addition, the final costs of Lexington and Saratoga, which included a 90 percent overrun, were magnified by the nature of their conversion, so they were not considered representative.) Ranger, commissioned in 1934, initially could not carry torpedo bombers—which took on a
greater significance during World War II than it bore at the ship’s commissioning.30
More importantly, Ranger’s small size meant that it could not keep up with
the continuing increases in size and maintenance requirements of newer aircraft,
unlike Lexington and Saratoga and subsequent large carriers. This increase was
required particularly to match the fighting capabilities of Japanese aircraft. So
as aircraft on both sides became more capable, Ranger slipped toward obsolescence.31 The result was that the naval leadership deemed World War II Pacific
operations too dangerous for Ranger, so it was kept in the Atlantic, where operations against U-boats were considered to be of slower pace and where the ship
would not face attack by massed enemy aircraft. Ranger did participate in support
of Operation TORCH and the North Africa landings.32 However, its overall contributions were not considered significant, because land-based aircraft were readily
available in the European theater.33
Rear Admiral Moffett did not live to see the commissioning of Ranger; he
died in the crash of the airship USS Akron (ZRS 4) in 1933. However, a series of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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“carrier spectrum studies” conducted prior to and during the development of
Ranger estimated that four thousand additional tons of aircraft carrier displacement resulted in the ability to add fifteen more aircraft—which was why Ranger
was built with an 18,000-ton displacement rather than the 13,800 that would have
provided five carriers under the treaty.34 But an additional four thousand on top
of that might have added even more. Thus, the overall conclusion was that large
carriers could be built at less of a relative incremental cost than was possible by
restricting them to a smaller size. Reportedly, Moffett later in his career expressed
regret at the decision to build Ranger. Moffett’s biographer William Trimble summarized the admiral’s conclusions, as contained in a 1931 letter to the Secretary
of the Navy, as follows: “greater displacement, he argued, allowed higher speed,
more compartmentalization, armor protection for machinery and magazine
spaces, and more hangar and flight deck space.”35 The experiment did not work.36
The follow-on Yorktown (CV 5) and Enterprise (CV 6) were each of 25,000
tons full displacement. Another small carrier, USS Wasp (CV 7), similar to Ranger, was built at 18,000 tons displacement; however, it had been approved in 1934,
before Ranger proved itself inadequate.37 Subsequent fleet carriers were built at
34,000 tons full displacement.
The Light and Escort Carriers of World War II
The U.S. Navy did build light and escort carriers to complement fleet carriers
during World War II. Most were vessels specialized for the escort of convoys, air
support for amphibious operations, and ASW. Flattops of their type were considered “mobilization carriers.” Many were converted civilian ships. The inexorable
requirement to build warships as quickly as possible precluded taking the time
necessary to construct an all-large-carrier force. To some extent, these ships were
considered expendable—and some were expended. Again, the Navy needed mass
and numbers, given the attrition inevitable in warfare.
The twenty-fifth through the thirtieth USN aircraft carriers were considered
“light carriers” or “austere carriers” and were designated CVL. Each was built
in two years or less, most were commissioned in 1943, and they sacrificed size
and survivability for speed of construction.38 Using materials already in the production pipeline, some were built on cruiser hulls.39 Their displacements ranged
from 16,000 to 19,000 tons. The Navy intended to operate them alongside the
large fleet carriers (within large, carrier-centered battle groups)—as wingmen, if
you will—not independently.40 The ratio of propulsion plant to displacement was
proportionally large, to generate the thirty-knot speed necessary to keep up with
the larger fleet carriers. The CVLs’ goal was to provide as much additional air
cover to the task force as possible. Operating within (and protected by) the task
force, all these ships survived the war; however, “they did not lend themselves to
the changing requirements of carrier aviation post war.”41
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/5
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Escort carriers (CVEs) were built only to support the escorting of convoys
(ASW), amphibious operations, and such duties as transporting aircraft (including land-based aircraft) to replace losses in the island campaigns.42 Some were
of new construction, some were conversions; a total of 120 were built during
the war.43 Many were built for the Royal Navy. Again, speed of construction was
everything; some were readied in ten months, from launch to commissioning.
Their displacements ranged from 10,000 to 14,000 tons. Flight decks were onethird the size of those of fleet carriers.
With an average maximum speed of twenty knots, the CVEs could not operate
with a battle group. During amphibious operations they were expected to remain
under the air cover provided by the large fleet carriers or land-based U.S. Marine aviation, if the Marines were established ashore.44 Protection against surface
warships and submarines was provided by cruisers and destroyers. If the CVEs
encountered Japanese ships when they were without protective carrier air cover
(such as in the October 1944 battle of Samar), they were expected to withdraw.
At Samar, a force of escort carriers and destroyers fought off a Japanese force, but
at a loss of two CVEs by surface fire (plus two destroyers and a destroyer escort)
and over one thousand sailors—more than at the Battles of the Coral Sea and
Midway combined.45
CVLs and CVEs were built to provide additional mass and numbers, to overwhelm Japanese forces. To put that in perspective, the Japanese entered World
War II with eight carriers and built twenty-one total CV, CVL, and CVE equivalents during the war, whereas the United States entered World War II with eight
fleet carriers (split between two oceans), then built 146 carriers of all sizes during
the war (that number is dependent on the counting rules). To repeat: 21 versus
146.
CVLs and CVEs never were expected to substitute for fleet carriers. Rather,
they depended on fleet carriers for their survival.46
Postwar Carriers
USS Midway (CV 41) was the first aircraft carrier completed after the war, although its construction was started during the war. With an original displacement of approximately 45,000 tons, the ship dwarfed all previous carriers. It was
the lead ship of an eight-carrier class.
Midway served for forty-seven years. Its large size allowed it and two counterparts, Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) and Coral Sea (CV 43), to be converted to
handle jet aircraft via the addition of an angled flight deck (among other modifications). A handful of the previous, smaller, World War II Essex-class carriers
also were converted to handle jets, allowing them to take their turn on Yankee
Station during the Vietnam War. The unconverted ships of the Midway class went
on to other duties; for example, USS Valley Forge (CV 45) and the even older
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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Essex-class USS Boxer (CV 21) could be considered the first amphibious assault
ships, comparable in concept to today’s USS America (LHA 6), which, like Valley
Forge, does not have a well deck and displaces 45,000 tons.47
The bureaucratically bloody Department of Defense fight in 1949 over the
proposed supercarrier United States (80,000 tons) resulted in cancelation of the
program and a seeming repudiation of the value of the big-deck carrier—largely
under the assumption that the next war would consist of nuclear strikes conducted by U.S. Air Force bombers. For many of the Navy participants, it took on
the appearance of a fight for the service’s very existence (along with that of the
U.S. Marine Corps).48
However, subsequent to the cancelation, real-world requirements dramatically
changed perceptions and assumptions. The swift advance of the North Korean
army into the South captured almost all land air bases available to the South Korean and U.S. air forces, so the initial means of applying airpower was the remaining World War II–era aircraft carriers. Thus, when the six-ship USS Forrestal
class was built (1952–61), there was much less opposition.49 Again, the perception
was that the fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-deck aircraft carrier had been determined to be both necessary and combat proven.
Lingering Proposals and Alternatives
This did not mean that alternative proposals disappeared.50 The continuing
development of the helicopter and the prospective development of V/STOL
technology inspired a continuing search for (presumably) lower-cost alternatives.
Helicopters certainly could not provide the capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft,
but they could land Marines ashore, thereby bypassing the difficulties of surface
amphibious landings. Therefore, supposedly lower-cost, specialized, “big deck”
amphibious assault ships—which could remove this mission from the lengthy
mission sets of conventional carriers—were justified.51
Great hopes were placed that V/STOL aircraft development would allow for
smaller carriers that did not require long flight decks, catapults, and arresting
gear. From 1972 to 1978, and particularly during the administration of President
Jimmy Carter, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy examined a
bevy of small-carrier proposals.52
Frequently noted is CNO Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.’s proposal for a V/
STOL-carrying “sea control ship.”53 However, Zumwalt himself directed the proposal to the specific mission of ASW, not as an alternative to the large air wings
and immense strike capabilities of large carriers.54 From Zumwalt’s perspective,
the search for alternatives constituted a quest to reduce the unit cost of ships to
“recover from the disastrous slide” in the total number of ships in the overall
fleet as the result of the retirement of the remaining (albeit modernized) World
War II inventory.55
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/5
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The constant refrain of these proposals was the need to reduce the per-unit
acquisition costs of ships, and the view that the increasing costs of large-carrier
construction—resulting primarily from the inclusion of emerging technologies,
along with the increasing cost of labor and materials, plus inflation—made the
ships “unaffordable.”56 However, this bumped up against the conundrum that
V/STOL aircraft simply could not match conventional, fixed-wing aircraft in
any mission area.57 The physical reality is that the power and thrust required to
lift aircraft vertically result in a necessary reduction in carrying load and fuel,
as well as a potential reduction in speed as a result of configuration.58 V/STOL
aircraft could not compete effectively (or even survive) in an airspace dominated
by capable, conventional military aircraft; rather, they could operate effectively
only in conditions of limited opposing air threats.59 The development of the “ski
jump” that allowed V/STOL aircraft to be launched via a “rolling start” could
increase carrying load and range, since less power and fuel would be required
at takeoff—but not so significant an improvement that they could approach the
capabilities of conventional carrier aircraft.60 Meanwhile, development of the
Nimitz-class, nuclear-powered, large-deck carrier (90,000 tons full-load displacement) had begun.
The debates on alternatives came to a climax when President Carter vetoed the
FY-79 defense bill since it included long-term funding for a fourth Nimitz-class
carrier. However, the ship eventually was reinstated owing to the requirement for
unprecedented operations in the Indian Ocean to counter the global expansion
of the Soviet Navy, as well as trouble in the Middle East in the wake of the fundamentalist revolution in Iran. To respond to these challenges, nuclear-powered,
large-deck carriers appeared necessary.61
One rather slender argument made in favor of the U.S. Navy’s examination of
other carrier configurations was that the Soviet Navy had adopted them successfully. If the Soviet Navy thought it could challenge the U.S. Navy on the high seas,
it was postulated, there must be something to these configurations—particularly
if they could be built more cheaply than a large, nuclear-powered CV.62
Of particular interest were the Kiev-class “heavy aviation cruisers” or “heavy
aircraft-carrying cruisers.” Kiev and its sisters appeared to be more-formidable
warships than any individual platform in the U.S. inventory. Their foredecks bristled with awesome displays of cruise and surface-to-air missiles. These included
the SS-N-12 Sandbox (nuclear capable), the SA-N-3 Shtorm, the SA-N-4 Gecko,
the SUW-N-1 ASW rocket (nuclear capable), and the RBU-6000 depth charge
system. Additionally, they carried 76 mm guns, torpedo tubes, and an assortment
of close-in weapons. Their afterdecks were taken up with an angled flight deck
that could accommodate a mix of thirty-two V/STOL aircraft and helicopters.63
Essentially, they were Moffett’s flying-deck cruisers.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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However, by the later stages of the Cold War it became apparent that although
the Kiev class was capable of performing modest strike-at-sea missions, it was
not designed to provide the capabilities of an aircraft carrier. It had a specialized mission: defending the Soviet nuclear strategic-ballistic-missile bastions in
waters close to the Soviet Union.64 This was a mission that the U.S. Navy obviously did not have. The missions that the U.S. Navy did have required capabilities
beyond those offered by combat-limited V/STOL aircraft. The flying-deck cruisers—as devastating as they seemed visually—simply did not fit U.S. operational
requirements.
THREE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
What can one conclude from this history? Three points identify themselves.
The first is that—operationally—the U.S. Navy has sound reasons for preferring a large-deck aircraft carrier over any smaller variant.65 History is our truest
laboratory, and fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-deck aircraft
carriers have proved superior in war. With nuclear power plants, they are globally
deployable. They are not some sort of naval fetish.
Second, the argument that small carriers can substitute for them—even in a
world of modern technology—is unproven.66 They certainly could not during
World War II, nor in subsequent naval operations. V/STOL aircraft remain a lesscapable substitute for conventional carrier aircraft.67 One can speculate regarding
the damage a People’s Liberation Army DF-21 missile might effect if it struck a
large carrier—but first it would have to hit it, which would be far from certain in
a war characterized by deception and a struggle for use of the electromagnetic
environment.68 A small carrier, if struck, is less likely to survive. Again, this was
demonstrated in World War II.
The third point is that, in the end, the debate over aircraft carriers always boils
down to cost. Their acquisition costs are much higher than for other ships and
other single-item defense programs, making them a natural target for criticism.
Yet that always has been true. The conversion costs of Lexington and Saratoga
were estimated initially at $21 million each, but their final costs were $40 million
apiece—a nearly 90 percent cost overrun. And yes, there were a lot of screaming critics at the time—including congressmen. Combined with a simplistic perception of vulnerability, high costs tend to cause critics to declare aircraft carriers “unaffordable” and “vulnerable.”69 However, it is very fair to ask—as former
Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman and Steven Wills phrase the question—
“Compared to what?”70
As Norman Friedman writes, “The belief that somehow the aviation community and the carrier designers are conspiring to hide the real advantages of
smaller and less expensive carriers persists to this day.”71 However, small does
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/5
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not inevitably prove to be less expensive. An interesting acquisition case study
would be to investigate whether the total spent (for ships, modules, and required
developmental programs) of the Littoral Combat Ship program—in which ships
already are starting to be decommissioned—would have bought one carrier or
two (particularly if, as Lehman and Wills propose, they were the size of a nonnuclear USS Midway).72
Likewise, instead of proposing only to reduce the carrier force to fund other defense programs, it is logical and analytically sound to ask which programs
could be reduced or eliminated to fund carriers—especially if we are firm in our
desire to avoid another Afghanistan-type commitment and to adjust our defense
resources accordingly. After all, aircraft carriers are combat-proven systems,
while their vulnerability to modern military technology remains unproven.73
To suggest a more thorough study of alternatives that includes a fair hearing
for high capabilities as well as lesser ones does not necessarily represent unqualified support for large aircraft carriers.74 On the other hand, neither does it mean
they should be rejected summarily.
A POSTSCRIPT: DID THE PLAN CONSIDER THE FLYING-DECK
CRUISER—AND REJECT IT?
The first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier, the ex–Soviet
Navy Varyag (now Liaoning), ostensibly was purchased by a “private” People’s
Republic of China (PRC) company for conversion into a floating casino; it never
became a casino. That is a story well known.75 A second carrier was built to the
same specifications. The third (and larger) carrier now under construction is
an attempt to incorporate new technologies developed for the latest U.S. carrier,
such as the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (i.e., EMALS).76
Less known is the fact that PRC companies also purchased two of the four exSoviet Kiev-class heavy-aviation cruisers, ostensibly as theme-park attractions.
Neither was particularly successful in that intended role. The first (ex-Kiev) later
was converted into a “luxury” hotel (reported to be near insolvency, having failed
to attract sufficient guests).77 The second (ex-Minsk), with its parent theme park
failing, was acquired by the PRC government in 2016 for display in a naval museum in Jiangsu.78
It is not unreasonable to ponder whether these flying-deck cruisers were purchased as speculative private ventures with the hope that they (like Varyag) would
be purchased, in turn, by the PLAN. The incongruous nature of their “private” acquisition—which included the cost of towing two poorly maintained large hulks
to China to be massively refurbished for use in a relatively low-revenue industry—primes this speculation. Although there is no available documentation, it is
very logical that they were examined (to some extent) as potential additions to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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the PLAN fleet but were rejected. Perhaps the repair, upgrading, and conversion
costs were seen as too great. The mission for which they were built—defense of
the Soviet nuclear-ballistic-missile submarine bastions—is not a PLAN mission
(as far as we know).
Or perhaps, like the United States in the 1930s, the PRC has determined that
larger, all-aviation ships are a superior (in fact, the most desirable) method for
bringing airpower to sea.
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